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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 930458-CA
Priority No.2

vs.
HEIDI ROCK,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal of
Appellant by virtue of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2) (a)
(1989), and Utah Judicial Code §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992, 1993).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether an off-duty Police Officer is justified in detaining
a person for ten minutes while waiting for another police officer
to arrive to perform further investigation?
The Court will review Appellant's claim of error on the Trial
Court's denial of her motion to suppress under a correction of
error standard.

State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991),

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The City relies upon the following statutes and Constitutional
Provisions:
I.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV.
[Unreasonable searches and seizures]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
On July 19, 1992, Appellant Heidi Rock was Cited for the
Offense

of

infractions.

driving

under

the

influence

of

alcohol

and

other

She was later formally charged by Salt Lake City in

an information in the Third Circuit Court with the same violations.
On November 27, 1992, Rock filed a motion to suppress evidence,
with supporting memorandum, in the Circuit Court.
On March 18, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was held in front of
the Honorable Judge Philip Palmer on Rock's motion to suppress.

On

request of the Court, the Plaintiff City of Salt Lake filed a
written response to the motion to suppress on March 29, 1993.

On

April 6, 1993, Rock filed an answer to the City's response.
On April 12, 1993, Judge Palmer denied defendant's motion to
2

suppress.

On April 16, 1993, Judge Palmer reaffirmed the Court's

decision on the motion to suppress.
On June 17, 1993, Heidi Rock entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of driving under the influence, preserving the right to
appeal the Court's decision on the motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 19, 1992, Defendant Heidi Rock was stopped by Officer
Jedd Hurst of the Salt Lake City Police Department when Officer
Hurst observed her driving her car without headlights and making a
wide right turn.

Officer Hurst was off-duty, in uniform, at the

time of the stop. R. at p. 63.

Officer Hurst noted an odor of

alcohol when he contacted Ms. Rock.

R. at p. 64.

Due to his observations of Defendant's physical condition and
her apparent mental state, Officer Hurst asked Defendant to perform
two field sobriety tests. Based on Defendant's performance on the
tests, Officer Hurst formed the opinion that Defendant was under
the influence of alcohol. R. at p. 71.
Upon forming that opinion, Officer Hurst called for an on-duty
Officer to respond and handle what Officer Hurst believed would
ripen into an arrest for a DUI.

R at p. 64.

Officer Hurst took

this action because Department Policy dictated that if an on-duty
officer were available, the on-duty officer should be called to
save overtime expense.

R. at pp. 64, 72.

Within five to ten

minutes of the call from Officer Hurst, Officer Rusty Isaakson of
3

the SLCPD responded.

R. at p. 65. Officer Isaakson requested

Defendant perform field tests so that he could make an independent
assessment of Defendant's condition. Two of the tests requested by
Officer Hurst were also requested by Officer Isaakson.

R. at pp.

65, 66.
Following

Defendant's

performance

of

the

tests, Officer

Isaakson arrested Defendant for DUI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

detention

of

Heidi

Rock

was

not

constitutionally

unreasonable. The initial officer acted reasonably in calling for
an on-duty officer, and did not act unreasonably in waiting for the
on-duty officer to finish the field tests. The five to ten minute
wait is clearly not unreasonable, and the reasons for the wait are
legitimate and valid and did not violate defendant's constitutional
rights.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE

DETENTION

OF

DEFENDANT

WAS

NOT

CONSTITUTIONALLY

UNREASONABLE.
A police officer may be justified in making an investigative
stop based on less than probable cause. Terry v. Ohiof 3 92 U.S. 1,
88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

The determination of when

an investigative stop or detention becomes constitutionally invalid
4

because of excessive length focuses not on the length of the
detention alone, but on whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct.

1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah
App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).
In Sharpe, the issue of an excessive detention was raised when
a defendant was detained 2 0 minutes by a State Highway Patrolman
who was waiting for the assistance of a DEA agent.

The Court

concluded

unlawful.

that

the

20

minute

detention

was

not

Considering the traditional justification for a Terry stop, the
Court noted that:
the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be
justifiable on reasonable suspicion, ... we have
emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 84 L.Ed 2d at 615.
It is clear from the Court's discussion in Sharpe, that the
determination focused not only on the length of the detention, but
also on the reasonableness of the officer's actions. The Court was
careful to note that:
[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in
the abstract have been accomplished by "less intrusive"
means does not, by itself, render the search
unreasonable, [citations omitted]. The question is not
simply whether some other alternative means was
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in
failing to recognize or to pursue it.

5

Sharpe at 687, 84 L.Ed. 2d at 616.

Other cases have confirmed this

analysis.x
The conduct of the Officer in Ms. Rock's case, clearly meets
a standard of constitutional

reasonableness, and was

"diligent

pursuit of a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel
suspicions quickly.1'

Sharpe at 686.

Ms. Rock has argued that the

Officer did not act diligently in pursuit of the investigation when
he discontinued field tests awaiting the arrival of an on-duty
officer.

Such an argument is clearly erroneous in light of Sharpe.

In Sharpe, a state patrolman detained an individual while
waiting for another law enforcement officer who was better situated
to conduct the investigation.

The DEA agent was better able to

conduct a full and proper investigation, although the State Highway
Patrolman

certainly

had

the

authority

conducting narcotics investigations.

and

some

experience

in

The Court apparently did not

consider this fatal to the actions of the officers.2
1

Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84
L.Ed.2d 705 (1985), United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th
Cir. 1985), United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.
1985), United States v. Streifel. 781 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1986).
Hayes, Recalde, and Gonzalez are distinguishable from Sharpe
and Ms. Rock's situation.
In Hayes, Recalde and Gonzalez, the
defendant's were transported to the police station for further
investigation without probable cause for their arrest. All three
cases specifically note the distinction from Sharpe, where the
investigation occurred in a much less coercive circumstance.
Nevertheless, the four cases cited clearly indicate that the
analysis focuses not only on the length, but on the reasonableness
of the conduct.
2

Further error in Defendant's argument is shown by
hypothesizing a situation envisioned by Ms. Rock.
The initial
Officer could have continued and conducted all the field tests, and
then communicated the results of those tests to the second officer,
who then would have transported defendant to the police department
6

Ms. Rock has also argued that the Officer's stated reasons for
calling an on-duty Officer were inconsistent with his actions
because he stayed on the scene an hour more to complete the impound
of Ms. Rock's car.

This is at odds with the record where the

Officer clearly stated that processing the DUI completely would
take as much as three hours. R. at p. 66, 67.

The Officer's

actions did result in a significant reduction in overtime pay.
Clearly, the detention in the case now before the court was no
more intrusive than the delay in Sharpe, and was occasioned by an
equally legitimate purpose. Although Officer Hurst certainly could
have

conducted

the

investigation

himself,

he

did

not

act

unreasonably in calling for an on-duty officer.
In United States v. Streifel, infra,

p. 6, note 1, the 1st

Circuit was faced with a factual situation somewhat like the
present case. In Streifel, agents from the DEA and the Maine State
Police set up a search operation based on information from an
informant.

The Officers waited at a home where they believed the

defendants would be going. When the defendants arrived, the State
Police blocked their cars in and immediately separated the two
for a breath test. If a test were conducted and the result were
under the legal limit, the second Officer would clearly be at a
considerable disadvantage in determining whether or not the field
tests warranted the issuance of a citation for driving while
impaired by alcohol. It is clearly the better policy to have the
Officer who administered the field tests conduct the breath test,
or at least to have an officer who observed the field tests conduct
the breath test, particularly where a ten minute wait is all that
is sacrificed.
It is also interesting to note that if the initial officer had
conducted the entire investigation, the Defendant would have waited
for some period of time for another officer or a tow truck driver
to respond to complete the impound of the car.
7

defendants.

They were asked by uniformed officers why they were

there and for identification.

Additionally, they were told they

could not leave until the DEA agent in charge of the operation
arrived.

The DEA agent had been on the scene, but left shortly

before the defendant's arrival.

He was radioed on their arrival

and returned to the scene about five minutes later.

Once on the

scene, he proceeded with the investigation.
Defendants challenged

the detention,

saying that

it was

unreasonable that they would be required to wait until the DEA
agents returned.

The Court, in cursory fashion, rejected this

claim by the defendants, noting:
[F]inally, that Streifel and Quinn were told that they
could not leave until Agent Steadman, the head of the
investigation, returned, did not render the stop so
unreasonable as to elevate it into a custodial situation
requiring Miranda warnings.
Streifel at 959.
Clearly, in Streifel, the State Police had the ability to
carry out the investigation in the same manner and collect evidence
just as the DEA agent did.

In fact, the State Police conducted a

cursory search of one the vehicles, a search that was later
repeated by the DEA agent because he had concerns about the
legitimacy of the search conducted by the State Police.
956.

This situation is analogous to the case at hand.

.Id. at
Clearly,

Officer Hurst's action were no more intrusive and were supported by
equally valid public policy concerns.
Other Federal case law on the issue of unlawful detention
seems to note a distinction between cases challenging the length of
8

the detention as opposed to cases that address the reasonableness
of the detention.

See

cases cited supra

p. 6, note 1.

In those case addressing the reasonableness of the detention,
the Court notes a common thread, specifically the removal of a
defendant from his home or another place to a police station, or an
equally coercive situation, for further investigation.

See Hayes

at 815, 105 S. Ct. at 1646, Gonzalez at 1132, Recalde at 1456.

The

distinction drawn in these cases from Sharpe appears to be that the
roadside
aspects.3

situation

in Sharpe did not

share

the same

coercive

Streifel appears to be consistent with this analysis.

Utah case law has also followed the rule set out in Sharpe.
In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of

3

Another possible distinction lies in the apparent lack of
probable cause in Hayes and the similar cases cited. In none of
those situations did the police have probable cause for a search or
for an arrest.
In the case now before this court, probable cause for an
arrest arguably did exist. Although the testimony of the Officer
at the suppression hearing was somewhat ambiguous, his final
conclusion was that if she had refused to perform any more tests,
he would have placed her under arrest.
The standard to determine probable cause is whether there are
sufficient articulable facts to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in believing a crime has been or is or is about to be
committed. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 94 L.Ed.2d 347, 107 S.
Ct. 1149 (1988).
The officer's observations of the driving
pattern, the lack of headlights, the defendant's apparent
difficulty communicating, the smell of alcohol, and the performance
on the field tests arguably would seem to satisfy the standards of
probable cause.
If, in fact, the officer did have probable cause to arrest the
defendant, any detention would clearly be reasonable as another
officer would have needed to respond to secure defendant's car.
Therefore, the detention would be harmless. State v. Cox, 787 P. 2d
4, 7 (Utah App. 1990), State v. Featherstone, 781 P.2d 424, 431
(Utah 1989).
9

Appeals of Utah upheld a 90 minute detention necessitated by a
search

of

defendant's

car.

In

Grovier,

the

Court

noted

specifically that the focus was not on the length of the detention,
but on the means used by the officers to dispel their suspicions.
Grovier at 136.
The
justified

length
by

of

the

detention

the officer's

concern

in

Grovier

for safety.

was

apparently

Although

the

justification for the length of the detention was different from
the justification presented by the Officer in the present case, the
reasons are subject to the same reasonableness standard.

Grovier

distinctly noted that no major interruptions occurred during the
search.

Grovier at 136.

Under the same reasonableness standard,

it is difficult to imagine that five to ten minutes is a major
interruption that would invalidate a proper investigation.

SUMMARY
Under

either

the

United

States

Constitution

or

the

Constitution of the State of Utah4, the Officer's actions were
reasonable and justified and the detention of the Defendant Heidi
Rock was proper.

4

As Defendant has presented no separate analysis under the
State Constitution, and no reason is given as to why analysis would
be different, the court should review the case under Federal
Constitutional guidelines. State v. Dudley, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,
P.2d
(Utah App. 1993).
10

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons the City respectfully requests
that the Court deny the appeal of Defendant.

Dated this 1st day of November, 1993.

11

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and
correct copy of the above brief of appellee to defense counsel
Mitch Zagar 3587 West 4700 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84118, and
eight copies delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
this 1st day of November, 1993.
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: 801-964-6100
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

|

MOTION TO SUPRESS EVIDENCE
IN DUI CHARGE AND MOTION TO
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE

Plaintiff,
v.
HEIDI ROCK,

Case No. 925020755 TC

Defendant.
COMES NOW, the defendant, HEIDI ROCK, by and through her attorney of record,
MITCHEL ZAGER, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to supress all evidence after the
unreasonable and unlawful detention of HEIDI ROCK on the grounds that she was illegally
detained after performing field tests for Officer Jed Hurst; and on the basis that her
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well
as Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution were violated thereby. Defendant further moves this
court to dismiss the charge of open container on the basis that the State has destroyed all tangible
evidence of the alleged charge.
Based upon the Motion, Points and Authorities, and surrounding circumstances, and in
the interest of the furtherance of justice, defendant's motion should be granted.
Defendant requests that oral argument be set in this matter.

DATED this "2/7 day of November, 1992.

TCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for Defendant

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Motion to Suppress Evidence in D.U.I.
Charge and MOtion to Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 3 1

day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 So.

200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

C'X^cCuj
Cindy Bruce
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone: 801-964-6100
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

|
|

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE

v.

I

HEIDI ROCK,

|

Case No. 925020755 TC

|

Honorable Philip K. Palmer

Defendant.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. HEIDI ROCK was detained by Officer Hurst between 5 and 10 minutes during which
time she was required to wait for Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene and conduct field tests,
which included some of the field tests previously conducted by Officer Hurst.
2. Officer Hurst had the same skills, training and qualifications as Officer Isaacson
concerning DUI investigations and conducting field tests.
3. Officer Hurst had observed the driving pattern and demeanor of Heidi Rock as she
exited her vehicle. Officer Isaacson possessed no personal knowledge of those facts.
4. Officer Hurst testified that the prolonged detention was necessitated by his off-duty
status.

II.
THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK BY OFFICER
HURST VIOLATES BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS AND WAS WITHOUT LEGITIMATE
REASON AND THEREFORE UNREASONABLE
Nowhere in case history has a Court held a detention permissible for the reason that an
officer was off-duty. There are cases where Courts have held that a detention was permissible
when legitimate reasons were shown. In United States vs. Sharpe. the Court found legitimate
reasons to find the detention permissible where a patrolman detained a suspect until a DEA
Agent with superior training and experience in dealing with narcotics investigations arrived at
the scene. United States vs. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 105, S.Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985). In Sharpe
the patrolman who made the stop lacked the training and experience in dealing with narcotics
and did not know all the facts involved in the case which were known to the DEA Agent from
his previous obser/ations. Id. at 1576. As further justification for the detention in Sharpe the
Court recognized that the delay in the investigation was created by the defendant's own evasive
actions in avoiding the police. IcL

In determining whether a detention is permissible, the

United States Supreme Court in Sharpe stated that:
. . . whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as
an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Id. at 1575
(emphasis added).
The Sharpe Court pointed out that "the question is not simply whether some other
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or
to pursue it." Id^ at 1576.

2

In this instance the detention is impermissible, since Officer Hurst has testified that he
possessed training and experience in dealing with DUI arrests equivalent to that of Officer
Isaacson. Furthermore, Officer Hurst was better situated that Officer Isaacson to conduct the
DUI investigation, having personally observed the driving pattern of Heidi Rock and her
demeanor as she exited her vehicle. It was Officer Hurst in this case who possessed all the facts
involved in the case, not Officer Isaacson. The legitimate reasons supporting the permissible
detention in Sharpe are not present in this case.
Legitimate reasons for a prolonged detention were also found in State vs. Grovier where
a vehicle search occurred during a 90-minute period without major interruption and where the
delay was necessitated to ensure the officers' safety. State vs. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah
App. 1991). In our case there was no reason nor necessity to seek an alternative investigation
procedure. There was only one course of action that was reasonable and that was for Officer
Hurst to complete his investigation without delay by conducting a sufficient number of field tests
to determine Heidi Rock's sobriety. Incidently, a hand-off arrest could have been made to
Officer Isaacson in the event Heidi Rock was eventually arrested, thereby satisfying Officer
Hurst's concern regarding his off-duty status.
The Court in Grovier states that:
. . . the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Grovier at 136
(emphasis added).
In this case the prolonged detention was not necessary to determine whether Heidi Rock
was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Hurst had the skills to complete the investigation
and make the determination without delay. The fact that Officer Hurst was off duty is not a

3

legitimate reason recognized by any Court to detain an individual's freedom. Officer Hurst's
failure to complete his investigation without delay is unreasonable, unnecessary and
impermissible. Absent a legitimate reason, Heidi Rock's fundamental rights as guaranteed by
the Utah and United States Constitutions were violated and require suppression of evidence
following the unlawful detention.
III.
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY SALT LAKE CITY POLICE
OFFICERS REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE
In this instance Salt Lake City Police Officers destroyed material, tangible evidence
which they allege was an open container of alcohol.

Heidi Rock is denied her due process

under the United States and Utah Constitutions and is deprived of an opportunity to effectively
cross-examine and confront the allegations against her due to the destruction of material evidence
as described. Her opportunity to test and otherwise examine the alleged evidence is gone as a
result of the Officers' actions.
Admission of the officers' testimony that the label on the bottle said vodka is hearsay and
also violates the Best Evidence Rule. For the reasons stated, the charge of Open Container
requires dismissal.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The unreasonable, unjustified and unnecessary detention of Heidi Rock violates her
fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under the United States and Utah Constitutions as stated.
The reason given that Officer Hurst was off-duty is not a legitimate reason, nor has it been
recognized as such in any case cited as a justification to violating a person's fundamental rights.

4

This instance is plainly distinguishable from the legitimate reasons for extended detentions
upheld in each of the cases cited before this Court.
Furthermore, the destruction of material evidence requires dismissal of the Open
Container Charge.
Officer Hurst's arbitrary and unreasonable actions in detaining Heidi Rock without
legitimate reason requires suppression of all the evidence obtained after the unlawful detention.
Based upon the pleadings, testimony and oral argument, defendant moves this Honorable Court
to grant this Motion for Suppression and Dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J * _ day of April, 1993.

Mitchel Zager
Attorney for Defei
MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion To Suppress Evidence and
Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this 6th day of April,
1993, to Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Salt Lake City Coip,
Plaintiff,

Decision
Case No. 925020755TC

vs
Heidi Rock,
Defendant

The time for further responsive memorandum in the above entitled case having
expired, the court now renders its decision on defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss.
On the motion to suppress, the court finds that the detention of the defendant
in order to wait for an on-duty officer to complete the investigation was not unreasonable. It
served valid public interests and did not unreasonably detain the defendant. The motion to
suppress is therefore denied.
On the motion to dismiss the charge of open container, the fact that the officer
destroyed the alleged alcohol and its container would go to the weight, not the admissibility
of the evidence, and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced by the destruction. The motion
to dismiss is accordingly denied.
The matter is set for Jury Trial on the 19th of May at 9:00 a. m. No further notice
will be provided.
DATED this

/J^

dav of April, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision was mailed
to :
TODD J. GODFREY
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
451 South 200 East # 125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
MR MITCHELL ZAGER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118

on the

/J**

day of April, 1993

QL

398

j u m u i A L CODE
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for t h e Court of Appeals are the
same as for t h e Supreme Court
1988
78-2a-3.

Court of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court,
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony,
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other cnminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony,

(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
1992
78~2a-4. Review of a c t i o n s b y Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
1986
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state
1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2 Repealed
78-3-3
Term of judges — Vacancy
78-3-4
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
merged
78-3-5
Repealed
78-3-6
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly
78-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed
78-3-11 5
State District Court Administrative
System
78-3-12
Repealed
78-3-12 5
Costs of system
78-3-13
Repealed
78-3-13 4
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries
78-3-13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed
78-3-14 5
Allocation of district court fees and
fines
78-3-15 to 78-3-17 Repealed
78-3-17 5
Application of savings accruing to
counties
78-3-18
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title
78-3-19
Purpose of act
78-3-20
Definitions
78-3-21
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports
78-3-21 5
Data bases for judicial boards
78-3-22
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties
78-3-23
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary
78-3-24
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or
recognizance
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his
own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present
any information material to the imposition of sentence
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in
his absence If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the
court
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence The officer delivering the defendant to the
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make his return
on the commitment and file it with the court
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment Upon arresting judgment
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is charged
anew or retned, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances
Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion If additional time is required to
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems
reasonable
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in
the same position as if no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either
m evidence or in argument
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its
own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when*

Rule 26

(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional
delay in bringing defendant to trial,
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of particulars
furnished m support thereof, do not constitute
the offense intended to be charged m the pleading so filed,
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and
prejudicial defect m the impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury,
(4) The court is without jurisdiction, or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of
limitations
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set
forth m an order and entered m the minutes
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that
there was unreasonable delay, or the court is without
jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in
the information or indictment, or there was a defect
in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to
the grand jury, further prosecution for the offense
shall not be barred and the court may make such
orders with respect to the custody of the defendant
pending the filing of new charges as the interest of
justice may require Otherwise the defendant shall be
discharged and bail exonerated
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional
delay in bringing the defendant to trial or based upon
the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other
prosecution for the offense charged
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party The
injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise
before the court or in writing The reasons for the
order shall be set forth therein and entered in the
minutes The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the
misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer
while in the performance of his duties, or notously, or
with an intent to commit a felony
Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from,
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party oi his
attorney of record Proof of service of the copy shal 1 be
filed with the court
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether
by verdict or plea,
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting
the substantial nghts of the defendant,
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition
for review, the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice, or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution
from
(a) a final judgment of dismissal,
(b) an order arresting judgment,
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of
a speedy tnal,
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or
any part of it invalid,

